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Villegas: South American Trade

ARTICLE
THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGE OF THE COMMON
MARKET IN SOUTH AMERICA:
REMA UNDER MERCOSUR
By PEDRO VILLEGAS *

I.

INTRODUCTION

As trade integration continues to be a central feature of the
contemporary Latin American economic metamorphosis, the
extent to which trade liberalization and concerns for environmental quality have been linked continues to vary across the
Americas. In some cases, expeditious negotiation of interAmerican trade pacts have not been matched by equally ambitious efforts to address long-standing and emerging environmental dilemmas. In other cases, political commitments to
safeguard and to improve environmental quality alongside
freer trade have resulted in new internl:\tional institutional responses to environmental matters. Differences among domestic political economies and international positioning may explain this uneven environmental policy development. For
whatever reason, asymmetries among environmental policies

*. Pedro Villegas is the Senior Consultant to the Select Committee on CaliforniaMexico Affairs of the California State Assembly. Mr. Villegas previously served as
Program Administrator for the Pacific Council on International Policy's Haynes Program on Southern California's Global Engagement. Mr. Villegas holds a B.A. in Government and International Relations from the University of Notre Dame and a Master
of Pacific International Affairs from the Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego.

445

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 5

446 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 29:445
conceived in tandem with separate liberalization agreements in
the Americas pose a variety of difficulties both for the physical
state of the inter-American environment and for the political
task of negotiating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
The largest and most strategic inter-American trade pactsthe North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the
Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR)-best illustrate the problem of environmental policy asymmetry for interAmerican trade integration. Some observers have promoted
reconciliation of the two agreements as a possible avenue toward a FTAA. The difficulties surrounding this approach, as
Stephan Haggard, Director of the Institute for Global Conflict
and Cooperation, rightly points out, are daunting:
The NAFTA and the MERCOSUR are emerging as the
two pivots of the hemispheric integration process ....
However, it is also the case that the countries of the
hemisphere continue to disagree on the scope, speed and
structure cooperation should take ... Latin American
initiatives reflect quite different policy preoccupations
and have even been formulated in part as strategic
counterweight to American influence .... The key to the
hemispheric process rests on how the North American
and South American complexes will be reconciled. 1
Environmental policy is one of the often-overlooked "initiatives" where fundamental differences in policy pose a barrier to
a FrAA. Deservedly, the environmental provisions of the
NAFTA have commanded the majority of scholarly attention
devoted to the issue of free trade and environmental quality in
the Americas. 2
Above all, the greatest contribution made by the NAFTA
environmental side agreements appears to have been their un-

1. Stephan Haggard, The Political Economy of Regionalism in the Western Hemi·
sphere, 2·3 (May 1996) (research paper, Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, <http://www·irps.ucsd.edu>.
2. See Richard Opper & Mark Spalding, Mexico &rder Environmental &gulation.
in 1996 WILEY ENVIRONMENTAL LAw UPDATE (Stern & Volz eds., 1996); Mark Spalding,
Lessons ofNAFI'Afor Apec, 6 J. ENV'T AND DEV. 2 (1997).
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ambiguous insertion of the environment into inter-American
integration policy debates~ebates often asphyxiated by myopic attention to commercial issues. The environmental policies of the NAFTA, linking trade and the environment through
new environmental institutions, set the precedent for integration with NAFTA members. Put simply, the NAFTA set a
standard for environmental policy that conditioned the landscape of future economic integration with Mexico, the United
States, and Canada.
Less attention has been paid to the MERCOSUR and its
environmental policy components. Established by the Treaty of
Asunci6n on March 26, 1991, MERCOSUR seeks a greater exchange of goods, services, and factors of production among its
member nations-Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.3
The agreement calls for the coordination of macroeconomic
policies and sector policies as well as the harmonization of nationallegislation with the goal of enhancing member countries'
international market competitiveness. 4
The Treaty of Asunci6n builds upon a process of integration
between Argentina and Brazil begun in 1988 and as of January
1, 1995, member countries have been operating under a common external tariff, the basis of new investment and trade patterns in the Southern Cone region. 5 MERCOSUR has also
forged partner agreements with Bolivia and Chile and is currently pursuing alliances with the Andean Pact and, separately, with Venezuela. 6
Evident from the following analysis of MERCOSUR's environmental provisions is the recognition that like other important integration issues, the environmental dimension of MERCOSUR economic integration is managed much differently
than NAFTA's and even the European Union's, to which MERCOSUR is more alike in organizational structure. While the

3. Boletim de Integracao Latino-Americana (BILA) (visited April 5, 1999)
<http://www.mre.gov.br/getecIWEBGETEClBlLAlLISTA.htm> [hereinafter BILAJ.
4. Inter-American Development &nk (visited April 5, 1999) <http://www.iadb.org>.
5. Id.
.
6. Members of the Andean Pact are Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela.
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NAFTA institutionalizes cooperation among its member countries, the MERCOSUR lacks institutional mechanisms for coordinated environmental protection, despite rapidly expanding
and new trade practices among its members. MERCOSUR
countries share with the NAFTA countries similar environmental challenges born from border development and sectoral
adjustments within national economies. Yet, the MERCOSUR
relies upon relatively weak policy coordination among separate
national regulatory regimes to address the environmental costs
of economic integration. The context of environmental policy in
the MERCOSUR is quite different from the NAFTA context.
More disparate domestic regulatory frameworks, limited institutional capacities, and North-South disagreements over environment versus economic development are among a variety of
factors that conspire in making Southern Cone environmental
policies rudimentary. As Argentine commercial and environmental lawyer Guillermo Malm Green notes, "the specific provisions and regulations that NAFTA enforces are still merely
declarations of principles in MERCOSUR, which yet need to be
regulated.'"
The preamble of the Treaty of Asunci6n states the guiding
principle of the MERCOSUR environmental approach to be
''preservation of the environment ... on the grounds of the principles of graduality, flexibility, and equilibrium." From 1992 to
1996, the Reunwn Especializada de Medio Ambiente (Special
Meetings on Environment or REMA) constituted MERCOSUR's response to environmental issues. The REMA operated
as a sort of task force commissioned by the Common Market
Group (CMG}-MERCOSUR's executive body-for the purpose
of exploring how best to harmonize national envil'Onmental
legislations. The REMA, however, was not a part of MERCOSUR's formal structure, and not until 1996 was one of MERCOSUR's ten Special Working Groups (SWGs) devoted to environmental matters. Operating directly under the CMG, the
SWG on Environment simply continued the work of the REMA
on harmonization of national codes.

7. Guillermo MaIm Green, Environmental Issues and MERCOSUR, in FREE TRADE
AREA FOR THE AMERICAS 184 (Joseph A. McKinney & Melissa Essary eds., 1995).
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MERCOSUR's environmental policy development according
to the precepts of "graduality, flexibility, and equilibrium" has
proven insufficient in light of Southern Cone environmental
problems. Freer trade in the region has brought negative environmental outcomes linked to large-scale infrastructure projects and to the intensification of export industries. The subsequent activism of environmentalists in MERCOSUR countries
and abroad poses a significant political barrier to FTAA-particularly in the United States. This uneven development of
trade and environmental policies is extending beyond MERCOSUR, as recent negotiations to expand MERCOSUR trade to
the Andean Community may proliferate weak environmental
measures across South America. 8
Debates in the United States over granting "fast track" negotiating authority to President Clinton and Chilean accession
to the NAFTA suggest that the long-term prospect for a FTAA
built upon NAFTA-MERCOSUR integration is undermined by
an emerging juxtaposition. At least partial policy mediation of
environmental outcomes in the North contrasts against environmental degradation unmitigated by nascent, even complaisant, environmental politics in the South. Polarizing environmental practices between integration accords has the continental effect of strengthening politically critical environmental
constituencies in the U.S. and of inviting recriminations by the
Northern business community of unfair competitive advantages accruing to MERCOSUR exporters under loose environmental regimes.
This article will fIrst discuss the type of cooperation that
MERCOSUR provides for negotiation of trade and environmental policies. Comparison with the NAFTA illustrates the
limited range of MERCOSUR initiatives beyond trade policies
and its defense within general inter-American development
debates. Second, the article offers a profile of current Southern
Cone environmental challenges. Third, the article lays out
MERCOSUR's environmental policies and the paucity of prog-

8. See British Broadcasting Corporation, Andean Summit Final Document Stresses
Need for Further Integration, Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 April 1997 available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws me.
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ress made in adequately addressing those environmental challenges.
THE NAFTA AND THE MERCOSUR: INTEGRATION
II.
VERSUS COOPERATION
The MERCOSUR and the NAFTA are distinct types of regional agreements that reflect unique histories, national political economies and member country's diplomatic relations. Internal national politics and international power dynamics
among member countries specifically inform. the degree and
kind of cooperation under each pact. Several analyses of modern integration efforts observe these structural differences between the NAFrAand the MERCOSUR. Peter Smith, Director
of the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, notes
significant differences in scope, depth, institutionalization and
centralization between the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR--the
latter arguably falling short of his integration criteria on environmental matters:
Integration is not the same as intergovernmental cooperation .... Integration entails the creation of a new entity ... that provides a recognized framework for accommodation among member states on issues relating
to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital or
persons. Integration thus provides information, establishes common expectations, and assures a level of predictability. Intergovernmental cooperation, on the other
hand, results from ad hoc bargaining between sovereign
states; it does not necessarily occur within a framework
of long-term expectations, convergent interests, and
shared benefits. 9
In codifying Smith's observation, the typology of integration
has been described as consisting of four gradations ranging
from comprehensive political, economic and social integration

9. PETER SMITH, THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS. 510 (Peter Smith ed., 1993).
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(Type I) to simple cooperation pacts (Type 1V).10 In both
schemes, the NAFTA rates as a much more comprehensive,
cooperative and binding agreement than the MERCOSUR.
The environmental institutions of the NAFTA demonstrate
more sophistication and intent than the loose, cooperative orientation of the MERCOSUR. In the case of the NAFTA, U.S.
domestic political accountability to environmental groups (and
allied, opportunistic political bedfellows) and historical relationships among the signatory countries produced a regime
consisting of dispute resolution and border environment institutions. The United States and Canada had established official
rapport on border environmental issues (transborder smelter
contamination) dating to the first half of the century. In the
latter half of the 1980s, Mexico's economic liberalization program opened avenues for renewed and closer cooperation with
the United States-cooperation that lead to the NAFrA and
negotiation of new environmental institutions. These institutions embody supranational characteristics and address a spectrum of outstanding and anticipated North American environmental issues.
In the case of the MERCOSUR, the tenuous relationships
between signatory countries and the relative weakness of public influence on policymaking partially account for the pact's
initial exclusion of environmental concerns and, later, for the
past's belated, perfunctory and compartmentalized treatment
of environmental iss':les. MERCOSUR's exceedingly cautious
and slow approach to environmental issues might also reflect
historically contentious member countries' diplomatic relations.
In the 1970s, MERCOSUR countries were governed militarily
and some approached war with each other over water rights to
the Parana River.ll Member countries have reasonable historical reasons to be averse to any overarching authority on eco-

10. Manfred Mols, &gional Integration and the International System, in CoopERATION OR RIVALRY: REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS AND THE PACIFIC RIM

15-24 (Nishijima & Smith eds., 1996).
11. See Diana Tussie & Patricia 1. Vasquez, The FTAA, MERCOSUR, and the Environment, Presentation at the Trade and the Environment in the Americas Conference 7-9 (University of California, Los Angeles, April 11, 1997).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 5

452 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:445
nomic or other matters. As in macroeconomic policy, according
to Argentina's former secretary for MERCOSUR, Felix Peiia,
the pact has severe difficulties advancing beyond "a minimum
consensus on economic fundamentals."12 The MERCOSUR
consensus is a frail and extremely flexible consensus, thus constraining the scope and the depth of its policies-environment
included-in the Southern Cone. Over twenty years, however,
the necessity of economic growth through improved trade
slowly eroded lingering diplomatic suspicions.
The weakness of MERCOSUR environmental policies has
more practical roots as well. Contradictions between Brazilian
and Argentine economic policies require that commitments to
MERCOSUR be flexible in order to accommodate domestic political economies. 13 Brazilian economist Gilson Swartz posits
the tentativeness of MERCOSUR coordination even on its principal objective, trade liberalization:
after the Mexican crisis, when Argentina came close to
default on its foreign obligations and Brazil faced a
speculative attack on its new currency ... [b]oth governments reacted with raising import tariffs and negotiating of wider exception lists and new, more flexible
schedules for MERCOSUR common external tal·iffs. In
short, pragmatism won out over any sort of ideological
or utopian integration ideal. 14
This notion has been seconded: "Pragmatism seems to be
the essence behind the functioning of MERCOSUR. Agile deci-

12. Felix Pena, Strategies for Macroeconomic Coordination: Reflections on the Case
of MERCOSUR, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS,
supra note 9, at 184.
13. Interestingly, recent swings in trade flows between Argentina and Brazil have
revealed a strikingly weakness in MERCOSUR cooperation in the area of exchange
rate management (an area where Argentina's currency board imposes strict limits on
cooperation). Following a strong aversion to things supranational, Brazil resorted to
negotiated ad hoc unilateral import controls on automobiles, for example, to counter an
unfavorable shift in its terms of trade with Argentina.
14. Gilson Schwartz, Brazil, MERCOSUR, and SAFI'A: DestructilJe Restructuring
or Pan·American Integration?, in COOPERATION OR RIVALRY: REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN
THE AMERICAS AND THE PACIFIC RIM, supra note 10.
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sion-making and no supranational institutions are the core
elements behind its obvious flexibility."15
The member countries of MERCOSUR have been reluctant
to incorporate stringent environmental policies for an additional, generalized reason that echoes traditional North-South
debates on development. "Some government sectors still believe that such [environmental] legislation should not hinder
the economic development process."16 Brazil, in particular, has
been quick to point out the role of over-consumption in the developed countries of the North. Environmental degradation in
Latin American countries is fundamentally linked to practices
and excessive demand in rich countries. The effects of excessive hydrocarbon use by Northern industrialized countries on
the Amazon rainforest are a favorite example. Pressures from
the developed world for stronger and immediate MERCOSUR
environmental policies are hypocritical and are construed as an
attempt to deny Southern Cone nations economic growth. This
very real perspective also includes the possible imposition by
Northern countries of non-tariff barriers on Latin American
nations under the guise of environmental protection-a concern
that would clearly challenge Article XX of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. 17 In addition to these moderate
sensitivities, Heraldo Muiioz, Permanent Chilean Ambassador
to the OAS, cites more "extreme positions" that· categorize the
North as attempting "to conserve their natural beauties for the
sake of developed countries' ecotourism. »l8
Finally, the institutional and jurisdictional barriers to coordinating environmental policy in MERCOSUR are formidable.
Individually, member countries have very limited capacity for
enforcing their own environmental laws. Additionally, federalstate jurisdictional characteristics of member countries disperse environmental legislation in a way that severely complicates simple harmonization and enforcement of environmental

Tussie & Vasquez. supra note 11. at 6.
Green. supra note 7. at 184.
17. Heraldo Munoz. The Environment in Inter·American Relations.
RONMENT AND DIPLOMACY IN THE AMERICAS 8 (Heraldo Munoz ed .• 1992).
18. Id. at 6.

15.
16.
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codes. According to the Argentine Constitution, for example,
environmental protection is the domain of provincial governments. Argentine environmental laws, like those of other
MERCOSUR member countries, are ambiguous, often overlap,
and are inadequately enforced. The starting point for MERCOSUR environmental law is nothing less than a decentralized
tangle of environmental codes and regulations.
For whatever reason, the institutional and administrative
ramifications of MERCOSUR's environmental shortcomings
are alarming, particularly in light of growing transnational
environmental problems arising from infrastructure integration projects and from shifting investment patterns within
member country industries.
III.
CURRENT SOUTHERN CONE ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGES
Free trade among MERCOSUR members has brought some
market-oriented improvements in environmental quality. Argentine paper and petrochemical industries have successfully
incorporated cleaner technologies into many of their export operations. 19 Uruguayan and Argentine hide and Brazilian shoe
and steel production, however, exhibit a "dual production pattern," where new plants utilize cleaner technologies for booming export markets while older plants maintain "dirty" production for the domestic market. 20 On balance, economic integration has produced more challenges to environmental quality in
the Southern Cone than environmental policy development
within the MERCOSUR has been willing or capable of addressing.
Among MERCOSUR initiatives to promote trade are large
land, sea and river route integration projects which produce
entirely new sets of environmental and developmental consid-

19. See N. Birdsall & D. Wheeler, Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin
America: Where are the Pollution Havens? 2 J. ENV'T & DEY. 1 (Winter 1993); D.
Chudnovsky et al., Los Limites de La Apertura: Liberalizacion, reestructuracion produc·
tiva y medio ambiente, ALIANZA, 1996, Editorial.
20. Tussie & Vasquez, supra note 11, at 16.
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erations for member countries. For example, the proposed
2,130-mile river highway-the Hidrovia stretching from Nueva
Palmira, Uruguay to Caceres, Brazil-has dire and immediate
implications for the Pantanal, the world's largest wetlands. 21
The project, scheduled to begin construction in 1997, would join
the Parana and Paraguay rivers in an effort to integrate local
river economies in all member countries and Bolivia. The project would require a massive diversion of water from the Pantanal into the waterway, thus disrupting the ecology of an area
that is home to 650 species of birds, 240 fish species, 80 different mammals, 50 reptile species, and 90,000 plant varieties. 22
Increased trade in mining, timber, and agricultural exports
transported via the Hidrovia will produce additional indirect
effects in the form of hazardous wastes,· fertilizer and pesticide
run-off, increased water demand, deforestation and desertification. Uruguayan rice production, 90 percent of which is exported (65 percent to Brazil), is likely to increase in the coming
years, requiring more water from Uruguay's eastern marshes
and, therefore, endangering that area's swamp ecology.23 Increased Brazilian soybean exports transiting along the water
highway will require greater biocide use and land clearing,
while, if unmitigated, depleting groundwater levels and raising
nitrate water concentrations to levels dangerous for human
consumption. 24 The Hidrovia would also place the secondlargest deposit of iron and manganese in Corumba, Brazil
within reach of mining exploitation. 25
Interestingly, the approval of the mining project, fmanced
by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank,
also raises concerns over multilateral fmancial institutions'

21. See Todd Lewan, South American Waterway Plan Spark Economy vs. Ecology
Debate; Environment: Planned 2,130 mile Link from Uruguay to Brazil will Bring
Prosperity, Backers Claim. Foes Fear Effect on World's Largest Wetlands, Los ANGELES
TIMES, December 31, 1995, at A13.
22. See id.
23. Among the species affected by the Hidrovia project is the black-necked swan,
which is in danger of extinction. See Yvette Collymore, Trade-Environment: Trade
Accords Undermining the Environment, InterPress Service, October 18, 1996.
24. See Friends of the Earth, Why Hidrovia? (visited April 5, 1999)
<http://WWW.foe.co.ukIfoeiltesllink13b.htm>.
25. See Lewan, supra note 21.
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environmental assessment procedures. In 1996, an independent Specialist Review Panel declared the waterway's environmental impact statement inadequate for failing to produce sufficient evidence supporting the contention that the Hidrovia
would levy negligible environmental effects on the area. 26
Developments in the MERCOSUR oil and natural gas market may also have significant environmental outcomes for the
Southern Cone. All four MERCOSUR countries have undergone the deregulation and privatization of their petroleum and
energy sectors. Greater demand for hydrocarbonS generated by
a larger MERCOSUR market may result in increased offshore
wells. 27
A proposed bridge over the River Plate and a proposed
motorway linking Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo are among ambitious plans to link railways and waterways to natural resources and agricultural production in Bolivia and Brazil. 28
Ground infrastructure integration hopes to introduce additional Amazonian gold and timber resources, western Brazil's
agricultural goods, and Bolivian gas deposits to export markets
and foreign investors.29 With the encroachment of roadsstretching from Guyana through Brazil to Chile, Bolivia, and
Peru-indigenous and environmental groups fear rampant deforestation of remaining Amazonian forests and irreversible
loss of species biodiversity in response to international commodity demand. 30
As in the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, transboundary
pollution emanating from pre-existing and untreated sources
remains a primary issue. The Brazilian Candiota thermoelectric plant located in Rio Grande do Sul has been a point of con-

26. See Tussie & Vasquez, supra note 11, at 12.
27. See Luis Castelli & Juan Rodrigo Walsh, Environmental Concerns Arising
{rom Natural Resource Exploitation in the South Atlantic: Regional and Patagonian
Implications, in 5 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LATIN AMERICA (1996).
28. See Collymore, supra note 23.
29. See Pratap Chatterjee, Environment-Amazon: Infrastructure Plans Threaten
Amazonia, InterPress Service, June 25, 1997.
30. For additional information, see the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) website
at <www.ran.org>.
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tention with its neighbors in the bordering Uruguayan region
of Cerro Largo. 31 Acid rain generated by coal emissions makes
its way across 80 kilometers into the agricultural region surrounding the Uruguayan city of Cerro Grosso. 32 Brazilian officials plan to increase plant production, while the Uruguayan
government's allegations of public health deterioration and
damage to crops in Cerro Grosso have remained unanswered.
The ordeal has escalated and captured the attention of Uruguayan politicians who have no MERCOSUR dispute resolution forum through which to voice their grievances. Humberto
Pico, Uruguayan Deputy Minister of Housing and the Environment, laments Brazil's "toxic aggression" and "wishes for
binational cooperation that never happens."33 As he plainly
puts it:
Brazil's promises to solve the problem have not been fulfilled. And the issue now goes above and beyond the aspects of health and environmental pollution, in light of
the MERCOSUR's (Southern Cone Common Market)
process of regional integration. 34
The MERCOSUR simply lacks institutions for redressing
the Deputy Minister's concerns.
This lack of environmental capacity within the MERCOSUR
also extends to its associate members. In a particularly acute
demonstration of border environmental challenges to the
Southern Cone region, the recent spill of 235,000 tons of toxic
waste into Bolivia's Yana Machi River threatens the surrounding ecology as well as ecosystems of the Pilcomayo River
running through Paraguay and Argentina. 35 The rupture of a
dike at the Porco mine of the Compania Minera del Sur (Comsur), a property owned by the family of President Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada, occurred as the President prepared to host

31. See Raul Ronzoni, Environment: Uruguay and Brazil at Loggerheads over Acid
Rain, InterPress Service, August 28, 1996.
32. See id.
33. [d.
34.

[d.

35. See Juan Carlos Rocha, Bolivia-Environment: Mine Spill has President in an
Awkward Position,lnterPress Service, October 23. 1996.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 5

458 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:445
the Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development in
December of 1996. According to the Environmental Defense
League of Bolivia (Lidema) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, this discharge of arsenic, cyanide, and
other chemicals used in mining exploration into the Yana Machi and the Pilcomayo compounds daily river emissions of toxic
substances-emissions whose regulation is impeded by limited
public resources and the lack of hazardous waste disclosure
requirements. 36
IV.

MERCOSUR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The institutional framework of the MERCOSUR is set forth
by the Las Lefias Agreement of 1992 and fmalized by the Protocol of Ouro Preto, ratified on December 17, 1994. The Common Market Council is the supreme decision-making body of
the MERCOSUR. The Council is supported by an Administrative Secretariat and the resolutions of the Common Market
Group (CMG), directives from the Commerce Commission, recommendations from the Joint Parliament and the Counsel of
the Economic and Social Forum. 37 As MERCOSUR's executive
body, the CMG is, in turn, supported by its Special Working
Groups that are tasked to develop policy in areas deemed vital
to the success of MERCOSUR.
The momentum of environmental policy within the MERCOSUR has been slow in developing. In preparation of the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, the presidents of the MERCOSUR nations issued the Canela Declaration. The Declaration
built upon the cautious commitment to environmental quality
of the Asunci6n Treaty and acknowledged "protection of the
atmosphere, biodiversity, hazardous wastes, land degradation,
forests, water resources, financial resources, international

36.
37.

Id.
See Carmen Longa Virasoro, EnvironTTumtal Aspects of Regional Integration, in
MERCOSUR, in REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: LATIN AMERICA, supra note 27.
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trade, marine environment, and the strengthening of institutions to achieve sustainable development."38
That same year the CMG proposed the REMA at Las Leiias
as a political means of addressing environmental policy.
Resolution #22/92, approved at the sixth meeting, initiated five
rounds of REMA meetings to produce a gradual strategy for
dealing with environmental issues. 39 Held in Montevideo in
late November of 1993, REMA I stated the group's purpose:
The REMA, considering the principles of graduality,
flexibility and equilibrium dermed in the Asuncion
Treaty, the principles emanating from the "Declaraci6n
de Canela" and the [1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development] and the necessity to
promote sustainable development, has as its objective
the formulation of recommendations to the [Common
Market Group] that will secure an adequate protection
of the environment .... 40
Additionally, REMA I enumerated the functions of future
REMA meetings:
(1) to identify and forge agreement on general criteria
for the treatment of the environment within the MERCOSVR;

(2) to formulate and propose basic environmental directives that will contribute to concerted action by member
states;
(3) to coordinate and orient the efforts of the Common
Market Working Groups where they are pertinent to the
environment;

38.
39.
40.

ld. at 13.
See BlLA, supra note 3, vol. 12.
ld.
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(4) to identify and analyze international environmental

agreements and propose ways of harmonizing these
conventions within member states;
(5) to promote the incorporation of environmental issues
in international cooperative projects within the MERCOSUR;
(6) to analyze the individual environmental laws of
member states with respect to environmental criteria of
the REMA;
(7) to identify and propose actions for the improvement
of the environment which concord with the objectives of
the MERCOSUR;
(8) to promote educational, training, research, and informational activities supporting the proper management of the environment. 41
Until 1996, the REMA constituted the nucleus of MERCOSUR environmental policy.42 Initially, environmental policy did
not rank among the policy areas meriting their own SWG. Peripheral environmental measures were discussed as subthemes of the more commercially focused SWGs. For example,
in 1993 Article 3 of the CMG's Resolution 5 founded an environmental commission as one of the seven commissions subordinate to the SWG 7 on industrial policy and technology.
Similar environmental initiatives were initiated under the
technical standards, agricultural policy and energy policy subgroups. 43
The REMA had serious shortcomings as a mechanism for
addressing environmental outcomes of economic integration.
Foremost, the REMA did not operate as a formal institution

41. REMAII was held in Buenos Aires in early April, 1994; REMA III was held in
Brasilia in June, 1994; REMA IV was held in Asuncion in November, 1994. See BILA,
supra note 3, vols. 13, 14, 15, respectively.
42. For documentation of REMA meetings, see the BlLA, supra note 3, vols. 1418.
43. Longa Virasoro, supra note 37.
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capable of monitoring and regulating environmental conditions
or of resolving environmental disputes. The REMA limited its
initiatives to cataloging separate national environmental codes,
surveying and tracking international environmental agreements, and crafting a gradual plan for the harmonization of
member country environmental laws. Member countries participated in meetings by submitting reports on the individual
state of the environment, on institutional changes within relevant regulatory apparati, and on changes to their respective
environmental laws!4 Indeed, this represented an informational gesture that kept environmental regimes compartmentalized along boundaries of national sovereignty. Proceedings
from the REMA are littered with national briefmgs on the state
of the environment in individual countries. Skillfully avoided
were (1) discussions of transnational efforts to manage environmental and economic processes, and (2) the active involvement ofNGOs. 45
Moreover, REMA depended upon sub-units of the SWGs to
draft environmental initiatives as addenda to working groups'
main tasks. It fulfilled mostly an advisory role with respect to
the SWGs. Channeled through branches of the SWGs, harmonization of environmental codes meant harmonizing only
select, trade relevant regulations, i.e. phytosanitary codes.
Natural resource management and environmental protection
were, essentially selected out of the SWG design.
In 1994, the REMA did produce, however, a list of eleven
Basic Directives for MERCOSUR environmental policy. It has
been argued those directives were "supposed to be the backbone of a joint environmental strategy, but [were] far from constituting an environmental agenda per se. "46
The REMA provided a modicum of innocuous political convergence on environmental issues that remained balkanized
nationally and within the policy domain of weak, national environmental regulation. Comparatively, it did not approach the

44.
45.
46.

BILA, supra note 3, vols.12-15.
[d. vols.13, 14, 15.
Tussie & Vasquez, supra note 11, at 14.
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intent or the sophistication of the NAFTA enviromnental regime.
In 1996, the Taranco Declaration officially transformed the
REMA into a Special Working Group on Environment en par
with SWGs on mining, communications, fmance, industry,
overland and maritime transportation, agriculture, energy and
labor relations. Taranco sought to elevate the visibility of
REMA's work and to expedite a plan for the harmonization of
environmental regulations and production and process methods
by the close of 1996. In April of 1997, CMG Resolution #20 best
summarizes the progress of the Environment SWG.
In that resolution, the delegations demonstrated their concern over the delay in the work of SWG No.6 on the Environment generated by the absence of all the delegations in the last
two ordinary meetings. The CMG reiterated the necessity that
all the delegations participate in the meetings for the prompt
completion of the legal environmental mechanisms for the
MERCOSUR, through which it will construct the point of reference that will orient MERCOSUR environmental policy and
the process of harmonization of environmental law among the
Member Countries.
V.

CONCLUSION
[I)n the articles of the [Asunci6n1 Treaty there does not
exist any norm on the harmonization of nationallegislations related to the protection of the environment or on
the establishment of a common policy in this area, there
is no doubt that in the near future actions shall be necessary in either of the two areas. 47

The Special Working Group on Environment has not promised a departure from the previous role of the REMA and a
movement toward a more ambitious MERCOSUR environ-

47.

Olivar Jimenez. Brazilian Association of Integration Studies. quoted in

MARTHA LUCIA OLIVAR JIMENEZ. 0 ESTABELECIMENTO DE UMA POLITICA COMUN DE
PROTECAO DO MEIO AMBIENTE-SUA NECESSIDADE NUM MERCADO COMUM 14 (1994).
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mental policy. There are, however, a few functions that it
could recommend, given the environmental challenges to
MERCOSUR integration discussed earlier.
The Uruguayan complaint of transboundary pollution at
Cerro Grosso indicates a need for environmental dispute resolution as conducted under NAFTA's CEC. Other functions of a
CEC-like institution are appropriate to the MERCOSUR context, i.e. studying and tracking the potential environmental
effects of new and expanding trade and investment patterns. It
could recommend support for MERCOSUR directives and/or
individual federal legislation supporting ecosystem conservation, technology transfer, pollution prevention, environmental
law enforcement, public participation and environmental assessment compliance. A plan for federal legislation in each of
the MERCOSUR countries designed to rationalize, consolidate,
and enforce national environmental codes could coordinate an
effective environmental regime while steering clear of sovereignty concerns. Recommending a facility designed to disseminate information on environmental matters and empowered by
approval and enforcement of disclosure laws would corroborate
progress in inter-American democratization and affIrm commitments to sustainable development beyond rhetoric. MERCOSUR border institutions could take the form of a Hidrovia
environmental quality organization, charged with regulating
emissions into the waterway and monitoring other likely environmental effects on the river.
It is likely that MERCOSUR SWG on Environment will con-.
tinue its slow and casual approach to trade and the environment. This lack of depth in MERCOSUR environmental policy
poses a formidable barrier to NAFTA-MERCOSUR integration
and a FTAA. The weakness of the SWG and the lack ofinstitutions dedicated to environmental quality and resource management underscore a continued reluctance to deal effectively
with the environment. They forebode of future potential limitations to economic integration. Environmental constituencies
in other trading regions may prove hesitant to compromise
their regulatory regimes with those of an environmentally deficient trading bloc. Given NAFI'A's commitment to upward
harmonization of environmental laws with trade partners,
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MERCOSUR policies would have "to green" substantially, lest
the organization become mired in accusations from North
American environmentalists and exporters (sensitive to competitive advantages) of lax Southern Cone envil"Onmental
regulation. Essentially, MERCOSUR economic integration has
left environmental policy far behind. The end result may be a
trade pact that is incompatible with the structure, theory and
level of commitment of NAFTA integration.
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